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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CONCEPT OF SECURITY FOR GULF STATES AFTER GULF WAR

BY

COLONEL MOHAMED AL-SULAITI

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by

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ABSTRACT

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After the crisis of Kuwait the issue emerged of the security of the Arab Gulf
Cooperation Council States and the necessity of it. Many perspectives were
suggested by the major powers of the world according to their interests in the region, as
well as suggestions brought up by the Arab Gulf States and other Arab Countries. This
paper discusses the importance of the region before and after the exploration of the oil. It
also considers the suggestions offered by those nations mentioned earlier. This research
concluded with the course recommended for the security of the Arab Gulf States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ASTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE GULF	3
THREATS FACING THE GCC STATES	5
THE CONCEPT	6
POLITICAL MEANS FOR MILITARY SECURITY	9
BIG POWERS INTEREST	10
THE CONCEPT OF ARABIAN GULF STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 1	4
SUPERPOWERS PERSPECTIVE	21
THE BASICS FOR A NEW SECURITY ORDER FOR GCC STATES 2	23
CONCLUSITONS	:7
RECOMMENDATIONS	8
FOOTNOTES	1
BIBLIOGRAPHY 32	3

The concept of Arabian Gulf States security emerged for the first time at the beginning of the seventies. It was one of the consequences of the British withdrawal from the area and the beginning of modern states in the Gulf area. Since that period, this concept has remained debatable at both the theoretical and practical levels.

Many Arab and foreign publications have dealt with Gulf security by study and analysis. A number of issues regarding security were discussed. The basic issue of the Gulf security which has remained controversial is its relation with Arab national security. If the concept is separate, it will lead to serious gaps in the Arab security structure.

Alternatively, the Gulf security could be a reinforcement and an extension to Arab national security.

For the last two decades, Gulf security has been related to some basic developments. First, the importance of Gulf oil in international policies during the period following the Israeli/Arab War of 1973. Should a result of increasing world demand for Gulf oil, Gulf security has become more related to international strategies and super power conflicts. Consequently the role of the Gulf states security has become increasingly important for the East and Japan. The third development was the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic revolution and the overthrow of the Shahs regime in 1979, and then the outbreak of Iran/Iraq War in 1980. (2)

After the end of the Iran/Iraq War, there were hopes of a new era of peace and stability and effective cooperation between the eight states locating on the Gulf coasts.

Unfortunately the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused big damage to many things, above all the Gulf security. As a result, some of the international powers made statements expressing the need for establishing a new regional security structure in the Gulf area.

This crisis coincided with other important international developments: the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the retreat of Soviet political role, and the emergence of the USA at the lonely summit. The USA military performance in the Gulf had reinforced this status. The US President made a call for a new international order for the Middle East to be based on a new security environment in the Gulf, a settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict, a control of armaments in the area, carrying out of democratic political reforms and a creation of regional and international economical cooperation relations. (3)

Thus, the Gulf security is no longer an interest of regional parties alone. Other regional parties, Arabs and non-Arabs and some international parties invest to have a tangible presence. The question now is no more a matter of relation between the Gulf security and Arab security only, but both Gulf and Arab security are vulnerable to many developments under the impact of the new challenges affecting the Arab order. (4)

The aim of this paper is to examine Gulf security after the liberation of Kuwait and discuss from the military side only excluding social, economic, etc. count big powers interest, revise Arabs and major powers perspective and recommend a proposed concept.

HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE GULF

The Arabian Gulf forms the eastern boundary of the Middle East and the Arab world. The area has been referred to as The Persian Gulf. This is a misnomer because of the seven Arab States lying on the eastern southern and western coasts of this Gulf sharing the Gulf with Iran but for simplicity henceforth called just the Gulf. (5)

The Gulf has been important throughout history. Prior to the discovery of oil its value stemmed from a unique geographical position on trade routes between the East and Europe. It was also famous for its pearl fisheries. The Islamic civilization has its roots in the region and the area flourish during the Islamic era. The Gulf was to play a particularly important role during and after the first World War when Britain acknowledged responsibility for the United Arab Emirates in the south of the Gulf at the time when the Ottoman Empire declared war. During the war, Britain ensured that the rulers of the Gulf maintain a united stance, fearing that the Ottoman Empire could influence the region through religious persuasion. In 1915, the Darin agreement was concluded with Adul Aziz Saud to gain his support and in 1916 a similar agreement was reached with the ruler of Qatar which was the first of its kind ever agreed to by the Qataris. (6)

At the end of World War I in 1918 the British government endeavored to maintain stability in the region and mediated in resolving disputes, such as Al Seeb Settlement (1920) and the Al Aqueer Settlement (1922) to enhance British domination. Germany and the Ottoman Empire were out of the competition in the region as a direct result of their losing the war. Russia had also lost all influence in the region due to the enormous internal change of power with the rise of the communist revolution in 1917 and its subsequent involvement in sorting out its own internal affairs. The role that the USA adhered to after the world war was based on aiding allies and did not help any country which tried to monopolize the area in any way which could jeopardize the interest of any other countries. (7)

Oil was discovered in the period between the two World Wars, which led to overall strategic changes. The American interest in the area grew and the region witnessed an influx of workers from other Arab States, India and Pakistan.

The discovery of oil led to border disputes amongst the Gulf Emirates. This was a new phenomenon previously unknown in the history of the Arabian Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf. One of the most important problems was the Buraimi dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on the one hand and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the other. Such disputes in reality reflected the conflicts of interests between American and British oil exploration companies rather than a bona fide misunderstanding between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. (8)

The discovery of oil also ignited Iranian claims over the State of Bahrain and other Islands in the Arabian Gulf. In some, the Gulf region has had a long history, and the key factor has been its strategic position on the trade routes between the East and West. It has also been a vital military and naval route of importance during World War 1 and a essential base on the British route to India. The subsequent discovery of oil in the area has had its political and economic consequences. These encouraged the USA to enter the region despite the British dominance. Indeed, because of its vast oil reserves, the Arabian Gulf has attracted the attention of all the countries of the modern world. (9)

THREATS FACING THE GCC STATES

The threats against the Arab Gulf States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the factors affecting these issues may be summarized as follows: (10)

- *Threats generated from within the region:
 - a. The rivalry between countries of the region, principally Iraq and Iran
 - b. The direct intimidation of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC Members by Iran
 - c. Israeli threats to GCC States through its expansionist policy
- *Threats resulting indirectly from the recent massive build-up of foreign military forces in the Arabian Gulf region and the Indian Ocean and the response that might be stimulated from Iran or Iraq.
- *The belligerent national of the Middle East
- *Involvement to the foreign presence powers in the area in conflict with Iran or Iraq

THE CONCEPT

It is no doubt that the aim of the Gulf security concept is to maintain the sovereignty and the regional cooperation of the existing States. The direct meaning of this aim is to deter any possibilities of aggression against the sovereignty and regional cooperation of the Gulf States. Thus, many experts interpret the concept of regional and national security to be military deterrence. Accordingly, the conduct of the Gulf security means the conduct of regional and international circumstances which affect the military security of the Gulf States. There are three levels of conducting the Gulf security within the frame of this understanding (11)

* (A) The Sub-Regional Level:

It is comprised of the group of nations overlooking the Gulf or directly in the neighborhood. Those nations play a role in the military balance affecting the Gulf States. At this level, the conduct of the Gulf security means the conduct of military balance among the strong neighbors of the Arabian Gulf States. This means if the power of Iran increases, it would be necessary to increase the power of Iraq. Alternatively, if the power of Iraq decreases, the power of Iran must be decreased to avoid Iranian superiority in the Gulf.

* (B) The Broad Regional Level:

Here, if the Middle East region is meant, Iran, Turkey and other nations on the geographical perimeter of the Gulf should be included. If this is not the case, then merely

the Arabian region is concerned so as to establish the security on a consistent cultural base. In both cases the security of the Gulf would be concerned with general military balance about establishing an order of security, i.e. a consistent frame for collective defense which can deter aggression actions. From this aspect, decision makers in the Gulf may discuss the preferability of the Middle East security order as proposed by the USA in relation to the Arabs security order proposed by the Arab politicians.

* (C) The International Level:

Security assurances from the international order super and great powers in particular USA and the West should be considered. Those nations have their own reason to defend the Gulf. The Western industrial civilization still depend on oil as a source of energy. It is also possible to look for a new frame of international assurances through the United Nations Organization and the Military Committee of Security Council as a corner stone for the new international security order under the new international cooperation.

All these levels of military security may be acceptable to maintain the sovereignty and the regional cooperation of the Gulf States. The true skill depends on how to integrate effective, appropriate and practical legal frames for the security assurances of the three levels together and at the same time.

No doubt that having a range of security levels for the Gulf and the validity of the same formulas and main basis for the Gulf security, military-wise, may give a considerable amount of assurance. The international and Arab embargo of Iraq forms also a deterrent against repeating similar aggression action. Nevertheless, this entire concept of security, represents old traditional thought within the conservative press organizations in the USA and Western Europe. In any case it is a concept not applicable to the Arab Gulf States for the following reasons. (12)

- The original factors which led the Iraqi regime to commit its crime will continue for the coming long term. The Gulf is not a reward for the ambitious dictators, but also an easy target for the strong ones. No matter how strong the Gulf States become, they will never be really competitive to their neighboring strong nations to the north and east. In reality the conduct of military balance is the task of the strong nations and even when weak nations attempt to become strong, they are not the initiators.
- If it is necessary to integrate a number of security levels, it is impossible to guarantee the complement to these levels to counter and aggression similar to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At the international level, the international order is still unstable. Let us imagine what would happened if the Soviet Union had not accepted the understanding statement. What may happened if a sudden military coupe were to take place in the Russia now or at any time before the Gulf crisis was settled? All these reasons lead to an incomplete assurance of the military means. They are the same reasons which call upon civilian means for the security of the Gulf States.

POLITICAL MEANS FOR MILITARY SECURITY

Earlier it was stated that the military concept or means is not satisfactory for security. This does not mean that it is unnecessary or the military means are unimportant. The military concept does not necessarily contains or comply to the civilian concept or frame. Alternatively, the civilian concept contains a military dimension. Thus, its favorbility can be proved.

Germany and Japan where defeated in World War II. They used to have the best military power known to humanity. The two nations again emerged victorious and superior to the nations who defeated them by shifting to a civilian concept of security, i.e., economical flourishing, cultural enlightening and political democracy.

The security civilian concept in the Gulf should be concerned about a shift towards a new flourishing of Arab civilization. It means also to be the doers and the initiators through creating examples of peaceful living and reintegration of different religious, political and cultural sects. The civilian concept in the Gulf should be concerned about causing the Gulf States to have a positive role on the regional and international affairs which reflects a good image to gain the trust of the people of the area and the world, and should be concerned also about defending new values together with peaceful development as grand values. Security is not just a maintenance of sovereignty.

If sovereignty does promote positive values, it will encourage anyone to defend it.

Finally, the civilian concept of security is concerned about a new civilization trend, this means a society where the scales of high performance and achievement is clear. These high scales of performance are not only applicable to the civilian establishment, i.e., economics and culture but, also in the military aspect. A society which is successful in the civilian aspect, should also be successful in the military aspect. The best nations are those who can change temporarily their establishments from civilian production to military production. (13)

BIG POWERS INTEREST

USA Interest

The USA had no diplomatic representation in the area until the American Embassy was built in Saudi Arabia. The aim was a preparatory procedure for the war in the Far East and the need for a military base in the Gulf area to follow up with the war in Japan. The Dhahran area was selected. After the end of the war the USA gave no interest to equip the base until the armed conflict in Korea had broken out. An agreement was signed with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in June 1951 to use the base, and in return the USA was to equip and train the Saudi Armed Forces. The agreement period was five years. After the withdrawal of Britain from the area, which was known

as East Suez Strategy the importance of the American presence became clear to fill the vacuum as a result of that withdrawal. This was known as the vacuum theory sponsor by Eisenhower. The USA believed that it was the only qualified and the interest of western states in the area.

During the Iran/Iraq War when maritime navigation was threatened in the Gulf area, the USA interfered, supported by Western European states, to secure the Gulf and clear the mines from the Gulf water. The USSR was kept outside this participation so as not to be given the chance of infiltration in the Gulf States. During the mid-eighties when Gorbachev took over power in the USSR and with the acute changes in East Europe regimes, the USA was operating alone in the Gulf theater. Since that time the US interests and aims in the Gulf can be divided into four main areas:

Prestigious Interest

These are the natural moral interest. The USA wanted to make Arab States believe that it is a super power with high capabilities and it is the only power qualified to defend Arab States, particularly the Gulf States. 14)

Strategic Interest:

These interest deal with international balance of power, militarily and technologically between the two giants. The USA was seeking to intensify its presence in the area as far as possible. At the same time it was seeking to reduce the USSR presence and influence and to reduce the Chinese penetration, particularly after the missiles deal between China and Saudi Arabia.

Traditional Interest:

This refers to the free flow of oil, freedom of the seas, and safety of United States Citizens abroad.

Mutual substantial and Material Interests:

These interest represents the nature of relations which link the USA with the Arab States generally and Saudi Arabia in particular. It includes the reinforcement of Israel security and strengthening the influence and power Arab States which have good relations with Israel . (15)

Within those aims and interest, the US strategy may be defined as follows:

- support of friendly states in the area, namely Saudi Arabia and Egypt
- the attempt to make as many as possible of the Arab States join what is known as the free world
- the denial of Russia from approaching the Arab oil resources
- securing the freedom of passage of US fleets on the seas and straits of the
- use of political, economical and military support as means of pressure to achieve US aims and policies
- exploitation of the area as a flourishing market for military equipment and weapon systems . (16)

USSR INTEREST:

The Soviet strategic objectives in the Gulf were:

• To neutralize or eliminate Western Military power and political influence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean area

- To create alliances with friendly States in the Gulf
- To transform the Gulf States into Marxist States
- To exploit the conflicts and tensions with West and its allies in the region
- To expand Soviet influence on the surrounding States that affect Gulf security and to enlarge Soviet ability to threaten or control both the various oil shipment routes and other Western sources of the oil and strategic minerals
- Power projection and presence in the area . (17)

AIMS AND INTEREST OF BRITAIN:

The British presence in the Gulf continued for a half century. Britain left the area during the sixties as a result of what was known as the East Suez Strategy, but Britain still maintained close relations with the rulers of the States with the aim of achieving its aim and interests in the area. Those aims can be summarized in the following: (18)

- The continuation of the British influence in the area, though the British completed their military withdrawal in 1971
- To secure the flow of Arab oil across the Strait of Hormuz to the Western Nations
- To keep the Gulf market open for British products
- The continuity of investing the Arab capital in the British firms
- The provision of the area States with modern weapons systems and technology and the provision of some states with military experts and advisors.
- The establishment of joint companies to influences the area industrially, rather than military (Queen Elizabeth visited the area during the seventies to confirm her friendship with the rulers. Britain participated with vessels and mine sweepers to secure navigation in the Gulf area when the Iranians mined the Gulf waters during their war against Iraq). (19)

FRANCES INTERESTS:

The French had no role in the area similar to their role in North Africa. The French language has found no interest in the States of the area, only few in Saudi Arabia and UAE during the late seventies.

Due to the geopolitical importance of the area and the need to France for oil, particularly after the oil embargo in 1973, France has started to give more interest to the area and was considered as part of its strategy for the Red Sea. Therefore, their interest are as follows:

- France has followed the same strategy of influencing the states of the area through weapon systems and technology supplies, in addition to the economical development aids.
- France helped the Iraqi regime in establishing their nuclear reactive firm which was destroyed by Israel. France is now supporting the area States with weapon systems and military training.
- Politically, France had many pro-Arab supportive attitudes in the international organizations, particularly concerning the Palestinian question
- The French sides Arab States which rejected Camp David initiative to maintain their vital interests in the area (oil). But when President Mubarak has come to power French / Egyptian relations have improved. France participated with the American and British Navies in clearing the Gulf from mines. (20)

THE CONCEPT OF ARABIAN GULF STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

BACKGROUND:

The theory of Gulf national security is considered as a definition for the entire strategy of those States to achieve their national goal and protect their international borders against possible threats, externally and internally. The concept of the Gulf security is not new; it emerged in 1971. This concept is a part of Arab security in general and a part of the regional security in particular. Many attempts have been carried out of the sake of Gulf security since the withdrawal of Britain from East of the Suez. Britain encouraged the establishment of the Arab Emirates Federation, attempted the establishment of a joint defense organization between Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, sought for the settlement of border disputes, and attempted to make Saudi Arabia and Iran to be more close as they represent the corner stones of security in the area. (21)

The British withdrawal is considered a remarkable event in the Gulf security question. In addition it was a direct cause for the increasing Soviet presence near the area which involved the area within the two powers conflict.

In the mid-seventies the Gulf security matter was raised and the idea of finding a security frame to be approved by the area States was discussed. Jeddah conference was held in 1975 and then Muscat Conference in 1976. But the area States failed to reach a decision.

Early in 1981 the Riyadh Conference was held, and resulted in the birth of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council (GCC). The council is comprised of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, The Sultanate of Oman, Oatar, and Kuwait; Iraq was excluded. The council emphasized the neutrality of the area by keeping it out of the international conflicts. (22)

THE CONCEPT OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL NATIONAL SECURITY:

The Concept of Self Dependency:

The conditioned aid that big powers provide to the area States represents a means of pressure on those States, in particular the military aid, the current economic aspects present a threat to national security more than any other threat: therefore, the foreign presence should be reduced by self dependency regarding economic development between the area States and by settling their own pending disputes.

The Concept of the Balance of Power:

Despite the changes which occurred internationally and in the Soviet Union in particular, which led to the fact of having one super power, the Gulf States should maintain a balanced relation with the United States of America, East and Western European States. The emphasis should be on economic aspects which will lead to success in political and security aspects. (24)

Goals and Aims:

Goals, aims and national interests which achieve the national security of the Gulf States should be defined. A suitable strategy based on available resources should be set to achieve internal stability and overall development. It is possible now to define the concept of Arabian Gulf Security. It is the strategic goal of the Gulf Arab States which coincides with the principles and interest decided by the political leadership (GCC) to

protect the entity of the area States, their right to survive, international prestige and their effective participation in achieving Arab national security. These can be achieved by utilizing their available resources and capabilities to execute the planned strategy according to a long term careful planning to achieve national aims. They should ensure to use their assets of power in all fields in a frame of order and internal stability to counter the possible threats internally, externally, regionally and internationally. All that within a frame of complementary Arab Security. To achieve Gulf Security, the following steps should be taken:

- Selection of aims to be achieved to cover all aspects of the nation, i.e., economy, foreign policy, defense, national security, etc.
- The aims should be within the capability of each individual state of the Gulf States. Ambitious aims which exceed available capabilities often lead to failure.
- Comprehensive plan, for the present, short and long term future including the setting of policies to be carried out.
- The continuous revision, assessment and development of plans to cope with actual circumstances and according to the available capabilities.
- The settlement of the pending disputes within The Gulf States and with the neighboring countries.
- The reduction of foreign presence in the area the counter action of Israeli infiltration attempts. This could not happen without a prevailing environment of stability and cooperation of the area States to maintain their own interests and the interest of the other concerned nations. (25)

ARAB PERSPECTIVES ON THR GULF SECURITY

Many perspectives for the Gulf Security have been presented. The following reflects the concept of the Gulf Security from each individual State point of view.

Oman Perspective

Oman has presented its point of view which was based on the following:

- The freedom of the area States to select their own political and social regime
- The freedom of navigation in the Gulf area
- Cooperation between the area States on the aspects of economy, culture and science
- Western nations as defenders of the oil producing States
- Gulf States participation in meeting the costs of military equipment to be bought by Oman from European nations for the defense of the strait
- The possibility of establishing a joint Gulf States Navy to defend the Gulf (This perspective was based on the military capabilities and resources of the Gulf States).

The proposal was rejected by Kuwait which demanded the settlement of the border dispute first. It was also rejected by Saudi Arabia which demanded self dependency to defend the Gulf. (26) In this aspect emphasis should be on the following:

- Oman demanded the participation of the area States in financing weapons procurement for the defense of the areas, even if those weapons do not belong to the State which participated financially.
- Saudi Arabia rejected the idea of defending the area by Western Nations.
 No doubt this attitude should be the base for the national security strategy of the area, but it requires the capability of the area State to carry out this mission.

SAUDI PERPECTIVE

Saudi Arabia presented its perspective under what was called Gulf Collective Security

Plan it included the following:

• Rejection of any military alliance which imposes obligations on the regular armed forces

- Rejection of collective defense concept between area States and foreign powers for the defense of the area
- The project militates a wide cooperation between police forces and internal security forces for all Gulf States . (27)
- The project encourages a form a self military independence for the Gulf States through the reinforcement of their armies combat capabilities
- The project considered as an aggression against the entire area states

It is necessary to explain here:

- The Project excluded both Iran and Iraq. They were not given any significant role. Iran has a special point of view on the Gulf Security. This view, as the Iranians believe that they are responsible for the Gulf Security and they are qualified for this task
- The Project gave more attention to the internal threats than the external ones
- The Project did not give an alternative for foreign protection of the area States if they face external threats, bearing in mind the poor capabilities of the area to counter such a threat. That is what virtually happened in Kuwait
- Iran and Iraq objected to the project because it contradicted their own ambitions and planned roles

KUWAIT PROSPECTIVE:

The Kuwaiti prospective was set on the base of a *Security Plan* between the Gulf States. It was based on the consolidation of political, military, economic and security strategies with assignment of obligations for each State. In fact, such a proposal requires a long period of time, although decision of security arrangements should not be delayed. A tentative well-studied plan can be designed. Then it can be developed or changed according to changes which takes place regionally and internationally. (28)

EGYPT PROSPECTIVE:

Egypt used to see a Soviet threat against the Gulf States. This threat increased during Afghanistan events, as the area lay within the USSR belt which ran through Afghanistan, Southern Yemen and Ethiopia. Egypt believed that the USSR had the means to create instability and troubles in the area, i.e. Arabia Gulf Liberation Front, Bahrain People Front and the Iraqi Communist Party. Accordingly, the Egyptian prospective may be summarized as follows: (29)

- Basically, the Gulf should be secured by it nationals. Therefore, it should be necessary to make Gulf States militarily strong
- Nothing forbids the participation of Western Nations in securing the area and keeping it outside the Soviet threat. The qualified power for that is the USA
- Egypt can participate by providing military facilities to the USA to secure the Gulf States when this security is asked by those States
- The present military power organization and equipment of the Gulf States are not capable to defend themselves
- Egypt has believed that the Gulf States have a strong link with the Western Nations and this link should continue for the sake of their own interests. (30)

After reviewing the above perspective to secure the Gulf area, the following conclusions can be devised:

- Gulf States have not the power to defend themselves against any external threat. They can defend their internal security against internal threats only
- Although the Gulf States realize the standard of their military power and the size of threat due of the regional and international conflicts in the area, they don't accept a foreign party particularly the big powers to defend them. The reasons for that is that they want to maintain balanced relations with the big powers. Moreover they don't like to be criticized by some Arab States opposing the foreign presence inside the Arab World.
- The emergence of aims and ambitions of some regional States to influence the area through their own security perspectives for the area.

- Some of the area States demanded the reinforcement of their military capabilities while they have a serious shortage of population. Accordingly, they are unable to man those procured sophisticated weapons systems. So the weapon systems procured would either be keep in stores because of the shortage of man power or call for foreign troops to use them, bearing in mind that those states oppose the idea of defending them by foreign nations.
- The security perspective of the big powers which was presented during the period of 1971 through 1978 and led to the establishment of GCC, were based on their own interest in the area

SUPERPOWERS PERSPECTIVE

The United States Perspective:

The United States perspective has emerged after the failure of *Nixon Principal* regarding the establishment of a regional force for the defense of the Gulf. The American prospective was based on the following: (31)

- The protection of American interest according to *Cater Doctrine* which depends on the threat of using force against any moves targeting USA interest
- The formation of a quick reaction force (expeditionary) and the reinforcement of the maritime presence in the area
- The reinforcement of Arab Gulf States to promote the effectiveness of their role n the area with emphasis on Saudi Arabia
- The exclusion of both Iran and Iraq from USA thought

This prospective implies the following:

- It gave Saudi Arabia a significant role in the area
- It excluded small incapable Gulf States. It excluded both Iran and Iraq because their policies contradicts with USA policy, in fact threatening USA interests
- The United States overview of the Gulf Security has become wider to contain. In addition to the Gulf area, the Middle East area including the Red Sea

- The aim of forming the quick reactions force was to counter the Soviet threat against the Gulf area or a threat from an Arab country, normally Iraq.
- As a result of the Gulf States decisions to take the responsibility of defending themselves and rejecting the idea of giving United States Military Bases in the area (except Oman), the USA reinforced its military presence in the area by keeping Naval Forces permanent in the Gulf. The preparation of the quick reaction force was also completed and Diego Gracie Base was developed to become a main Base in the area

USSR PERSPECTIVE:

This was called Brechaw Initiative it has included the following five principles.

- 1) The non-alliance attitude taken by the area States should be respected
- 2) They should not be pushed to join any military alliance member by nuclear nations
- 3) The right of sovereignty of area states on their natural resources should be respected
- 4) No obstructions for natural mutual commerce should be made. Naval routes which link the Gulf with other world nations should not be vulnerable to danger . (32)

By analyzing this prospective, it aims to achieve the following:

- Keep USA basically out of the area
- The area States have to depend on themselves to achieve their national security
- The USSR began to shift from the attitude of superior to the attitude of the participant in all the events of the area. It is remarkable that the USSR was not after the stability of the area. The USSR was seeking a presence in this area to interfere in the area States affairs as a step to build up influence

Now after reviewing the perspectives of the super powers to secure the area, the big power prospective has changed in spite of the changes which took place in the USSR and Eastern European nations and the understanding situation prevailing now between the USA and Russia and between East and West Europe. It is clear that the concept has not

changed. The USA and West Europe are endeavoring to maintain their interests in the area, even by having quick reaction forces to counter any future threat. At the same time Russia is seeking a significant role in the settlement of the problems.

THE BASICS FOR A NEW SECURITY ORDER FOR GCC STATES

There are three questions to be asked after the liberation of Kuwait. These questions deal basically with the area security:

- 1) What is the required area to be secured?
- 2) What form of security order for the area is required?
- 3) What are the priorities of the required security?

To answer those questions, it is necessary to explain that Arab national security should be the main echelon to protect all Arab States from Iraq to Mauritania, i.e. from the Gulf the Indian Ocean and from Egypt in the north to Somalia in the south. Under this main echelon comes sub-echelons which may have form of area security. For example, security of the Arabian Gulf area which is known as *Arabian Gulf Security*, security of the Nile valley area which is known as Nile Valley Security and the security of north Africa Arab States. (33)

The security of the Arabian Gulf should contain the entire Arabian Peninsula including Yemen, bearing in mind the geopolitical importance of Yemen after unification. It is one of the keys to secure the Red Sea and the Bab Al Mandab Strait. This sub-echelon can be called the echelon to be called *The Security of the Horn of Africa States*.

Regarding the area of study, is it the Arabian Gulf area, the Arabian Peninsula area, the entire Arab area or the Middle East area? In all cases the Arabian Gulf security should include the water passages, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bal-Al Mandab Strait, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal as targets to be considered in the security plan because they are main vital passages. Any threat to those passages from a direct threat to Arab national security. (34)

No doubt, bearing in mind what happened in the Gulf area, there are demanding priorities for security. The Arabian Gulf area should be secured first as an urgent priority. At the same time there are some sub-areas (mentioned above) that should be included.

The Middle East area should be the second priority. It also participates in securing the Arabian Gulf area and a large part of the Arab world. The third priority is the Arab world security to complement the required main echelon.

ARABIAN GULF SECURITY

Arabian Gulf Security required hasty security arrangements to secure the area including the oil reserves and the water straits. Those arrangements should serve the interest of the area States and the interest of others who are concerned with oil. This emphasizes the fact that we are living in a world of tangled interests and no nation can survive in isolation from other nations. Those arrangements should also bet set in a way that can serve the consequent arrangements to complement the security of the Middle East.

Basics for the security order:

The security order should be based on the following:

- The arrangements for security and security order should be Arabian. It should emerge from the Gulf area States
- It should be built on the size and type of present and future threats against the area. What are the aims to be achieved? Then what are the means of achievement?
- Security should be comprehensive to include the internal and external dimensions and the economic, political and social and military components
- The economical component for national security is the vital imperative to achieve other required security aspects
- Arab States should participate in those arrangements, according to the individual capabilities, i.e.: some States have the military power and other States have the funds to finance the security process
- The plan should be built to avoid the reasons that led to the invasion of Kuwait and to treat the effects of that war, whether within the area States or other Arab States. (35)

Facts to be considered:

There are local, regional and international facts to be considered:

1) Locally

a) The poor population density in the Gulf area generally

- b) The poor military power of the area States and lack of recruitment capacity to form strong armed forces
- c) The strong economical capability
- d) The majority of the laborers being immigrants whether from Arabian, Asian or African nations

2) Regionally

- a) The Arabian differences due to the disparate national aims and goals of Arab States
- b) Israel as a supreme military power, particularly after the war of Kuwait has its own aims and ambitions in the area and the Palestinian question remains the main source of threat in the Middle East
- c) The aims and ambitions of some States other than Arabs, i.e., Iran, Turkey and the attempts of the Iranians to extend their Islamic ideology and influence in the area
- d) The poor economics of the geographical and regional neighbor States of the Gulf States and the big differences in national incomes between Arabian Gulf States and non-Arabian Gulf States
- e) The interests of regional States in the Gulf area which are mainly economic, i.e., Gulf market and water straits . (36)

3) Internationally

 a) the new international order which aims at peaceful living, settlement of disputes by peaceful means and the spread of democratic regimes in the world

- b) The changes which has taken place in USSR and East Europe are aiming at achieving democracy. No doubt that those changes will move to the third world and the Arab World is a part of it
- c) There are international interests in the Gulf area which should be regarded without affecting the sovereignty of the Gulf States. These interests included the flow of the needed quantities of oil and the security of the straits. (37)

CONCLUSIONS

The importance of the area has drawn it within the strategic interests of the major world powers. In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis there is a strong Western Military presence in the Gulf in an attempt to safeguard it against future moves by Iraq. Meanwhile, The Arab World has lost politically, economically and socially through the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

The world has perceived objectively the importance of stability in the Middle East area to maintain the interests of the international and regional powers.

The strength of GCC States does not match those of the belligerent nations of the region.

An Arab World and the western powers support is needed to defend the GCC States against the potential threats until they make arrangements of security, which is not clear up to now.

While any proposed security arrangements for the Gulf area should be a GCC States decision, it should complement Arab National Security and the Middle East Security order, besides that, the Arabian Gulf Security should be comprehensive to include internal and external dimensions as well as economical, political, social and military components.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The decision for security arrangements of the Arabian Gulf States should be taken by the GCC States as a first priority.

Liaison should take place with the Arab League and the major Western powers. A complete security order for the Middle East should be discussed by the nations concerned. The security arrangements for the Arab Gulf States should include the following components of national security:

The Political Component

- The setting up of the common security strategy
- The resolution of local disputes within the GCC supervision

- The settlement of political difference between Arab States stemming from the Kuwait crisis
- An assessment for the Arab League and a revision of the charter
- Decisions should be taken to be self defense in the matter of Gulf Security, depending on local resources available, by implement of conscription recruiting systems
- Democracy and parliament councils, should be increased and given more political authorities in the Gulf States

The Economic Component:

- 1) The rehabilitation of Kuwait and Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein
- 2) The production of oil according to the quantities decided by OPEC and fairly enough to satisfy the world demand
- 3) Effective measures by the GCC States to promote the economics of other Arab States
- 4) Strengthen of States infra structure by increasing the foreign trade and build up of industries bases, to not depend on the oil revenues as the only income of the countries economies, in the future

The Social Component:

- 1) The removal of the hostile spirit between Arab States which has taken place after the Kuwait crisis
- 2) The promotion of the professional and educational standards of the Arabian Gulf people through the import of modern technology
- 3) Removal of the differences between the people according to the trilliums and races

The Military Component:

- 1) The immediate establishment of a common GCC Army, Air and Naval headquarter or department alike to NATO department, with qualified and sufficient staff, to plan coordinate and conduct exercises between the GCC States Armies and prepare the defense plans to defend the States territories and to recommend the States headquarters, to develop and increase their forces capabilities and readiness
- 2) Each of the States should recruit at least (100,000) military men and women for its own armed forces, by implementing of the conscription system for men and voluntary for women to join the State armed forces
- 3) The establishment of facilities to meet the need of allies during crisis
- 4) Maintenance of liaison and good military relations with major western powers and moderate Arab States
- 5) Intensive training to gain the proficiency among the army, naval and air force
- 6) Obtaining of the deterrence weapons are necessary for the military balance in the region
- 7) Concentration on strengthen of the air force and air defense is considerable

These recommendations can be discuss in detail and develop according to the security necessity and the resources available in each of the Gulf States.

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